ICANN75 | AGM – RSS GWG Meeting (1 of 6)
Saturday, September 17, 2022 – 15:00 to 16:00 KUL

OZAN SAHIN: Hello and welcome to the Root Server System Governance Working Group session 1. My name is Ozan and I am the remote participation manager for the session. Please note that this session is being recorded and is governed by the ICANN's expected standards of behavior. Please note that this session is intended for a discussion among the Root Server System Governors Working Group members. Other participants will be silent observers.

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BRAD VERD: Thank you, Ozan. All right, welcome. Hope everybody had safe travels and is well rested. Hopefully, we have a good discussion

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today and rest of the week. Yeah, come to the next slide, Carlos, or Ozan, I don't know who. Thanks. So based on the document I sent out last week or last meeting, we've got essentially three days' worth of sessions, so two sessions each day. I've tried to deviate up into three different groups to talk through. So hopefully, everybody's reviewed that document and kind of prepared to talk. I'm looking forward to the discussions. Can you go to the next slide? I think this is what's most important.

So just general goals, I was thinking about this. We wanted to focus on the issue basket under discussion. It's going to be hard. We're going to jump around a bit. So I'll try to bring everybody. If we jump around, I'll try to bring people back and then we can table for the other baskets rather than crossing lines or crossing streams, let's say. I think it's important that, again, as we go through that we're trying to identify governance principles, don't want to get wrapped around the axle on technical or architectural stuff. So this is all about relationships between entities and the stakeholders.

I think it's important to remember that everybody is just a chance to breathe. Some of these topics might be contentious, so we'll see. And just remember that additional comments in writing are going to happen after the session. There's no decisions being made here. We're just going through stuff. And then lastly, and you're going to hear this coming from me a lot, is underlying goal

is building trust. So as we identify these different principles of governance, yeah, there's this underlying question of does it add trust to the governance system. Our goal here is to build trust from the stakeholders. And so as we talk, that'll be a reoccurring question.

So with that, are there any questions? Let's put that out there. And Carlos, I'm not watching my hands. Can you yell at me if somebody raises a hand. Are there any questions right now? All right. Carlos, can you jump to the document? You need to scroll down. I think people have seen this. ICANN talk through some of it. Again, I think the focus on this was we identified a couple different baskets to group things in. We wanted to focus on governance principles rather than architectural or technical stuff. And essentially, governess is about the relationships between people and entities. So that's going to be a lot of our focus.

And then I talked about a path forward. So with the agenda, we've got the agenda set I'd like to stick to the agenda for the week. If there are questions about process going forward, I think maybe the meeting we have after Kuala Lumpur. So just to remind everybody, these are not official GWG meetings. These are not minuted. They are recorded, but they're not going to be posted. So the next official meeting, if there are questions around process and what not going forward, we'll all have time on the agenda to have that discussion there. So I'd really like to stick to

the substantive topics that we've identified and want to talk through here.

So the first one today is separation and balance of powers. There's a quick description that was in the document here that was shared with everybody. Just really quickly, again, I think we want to remind ourselves as to why we're doing this body of work or what and what our ultimate goal is, and I think it's trust, right? Trust in the root server system. We're trying to build more trust or add to the existing trust that the RSOs have built on. So the RSOs with their goodwill to the world have created trust in the root server system. And our goal in creating the root server system governance system is to maintain and leverage what the RSOs have already built and build a stronger foundation for that.

So with that, I am curious if there are topics or separation and balance of powers that people have. I have some of my own that I offer, but I'd really like to hear from the group as to what they were thinking or what they have been thinking as to things that we need to think about as a group or the governance structure. I'll give it like 10 seconds.

Okay. Don't hear any, so I'll just throw an obvious one out here. This group has spent a lot of time talking about finances and money. Some of our discussions around capture went to finances, we've just spent a lot of time. So when you think about

governance structure and you think about finances, these are an obvious question of should the same rules or should the same body that collects the money spend the money? Or should there be different rules, should there be a separation of power? What are people's thoughts on that?

The easy example is the IRS. IRS collects the money, doesn't do any of the spending of the money, collects the money based upon the rules put forth by the legislative and executive branches. Rather than trying to get into the amount of money or whatnot. I mean, the question is, what should the governance be around having--

CARLOS REYES: There's a hand from Geoff Huston.

BRAD VERD: I'm sorry?

CARLOS EYES: There's a hand from Geoff Huston.

BRAD VERD: Geoff, please go ahead.

GEOFF HUSTON: Yeah. Thanks, Brad. Geoff Houston here. And again, let me preface this by saying I haven't consulted the IAB. I wouldn't have a clue what they think about this. I didn't think when I read through this document about basket one that it naturally headed into money. I actually thought when you wanted to talk about separation of balance of powers, what you really meant was the issue that one party exercising their power could not unduly force and separate party, a different party is part of this root server ecosystem to be compelled for some action. In other words, I cannot exercise influence and power over you for a certain category of me and you.

And what you're trying to do is to sort of make it as a principle, as a governance principle, the issue of autonomy of the RSOs, the issue that any governance structure cannot force the RSOs or compel them to particular actions. Leaping into money kind of seems a sort of a gigantic leap. And I thought maybe we were the principal of finances going to discuss that tomorrow in, what is it? Tomorrow sessions anyway.

So I don't know. I think money is a distraction. And I actually thought you were trying to tease out and formalize this underlying current of the autonomy of individual RSOs, and to try and tease out the relationship between ICANN as for a provider of

a forum, but not necessarily the rule maker or forcing function. And those sort of RSS governance principles were what we're trying to get at. But I could be wrong, please correct me.

BRAD VERD: No, I don't think you're wrong, Geoff. I just went to money because it was an easy topic that usually people are pretty passionate about in engagement. So if I could turn the mic back over to you and expand on what you were adding there, I think that would be very helpful.

GEOFF HUSTON: Well, I think it would be helpful to capture in this basket that from day one there has been an absolute principle of autonomy of operation of individual root service operators that they are not dependent on any other root service operator. And as a separation of power, there is no third party independent of the RSOs that exercises power over one on more of the RSOs. And I suppose more is a bigger issue than one. In other words, if whether it's, I suppose, a government or a large entity that's controlling interests in many RSOs that I think would count and work counter to the principle of a separation of power.

So you're trying to define as a principle that individual RSOs are able to operate independently and autonomously in the exercise

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of their responsibilities. And equally what you're trying to do is to say, ICANN as an organizer and facilitator of the RSS has an inability. It cannot force an RSO into a particular action. And that to my mind would be sort of principles that would inform this discussion. Is that sort of where we're searching for?

BRAD VERD: Yeah, I think you're closer to it. First of all, the question is whoever the facilitator is, doesn't necessarily have to be ICANN, but in your scenario, ICANN. But I think that would be one principle that ICANN cannot force RSOs to take action. I think the question, as I raised money earlier, it was a question on who decides how the money is spent versus how the money is allocated type of thing. And in your example of the operation on can the autonomy of the RSOs for how they run their operation, I feel that that is we are no longer in the principal spectrum of governance. We are now in the operation spectrum. So that's where I distinguish between those. But I'd love to hear what other people have to say or think.

BRAD VERD: Wes?

WES HARDAKER: So I'm going to quote you from an hour ago. This is Wes Hardaker, USC. An hour ago, you said you didn't think we could enumerate

all of the conditions in the previous meeting. Right? That it would be very hard to come up with all of the list of either positives or negatives. What are all the good examples, what are all the bad examples? Because that's a challenging task.

And I think really the end goal is we are hopefully going to provide a governance structure that gives a high-level framing for what an RSO or an entity in the GWG resulting implementation should be doing. And there's a mechanism to call somebody out if they don't think that that entity is following that guideline, that they're not behaving as sort of the world expected them to with some sort of notion. So I don't quite know how to turn that into the right sense for all of the bubbles.

BRAD VERD: I'm sorry to interrupt, I'm just I'm trying to clarify what you're saying here, is you say somebody can call somebody out. Are you saying an RSO could call out an RSO, or you're calling anybody can call out an RSO, or can you give me a little bit more than that?

WES HARDAKER: I can, but then I have to admit my lack of complete clarity on what part of the GWG we're talking about. So we have all of the RSOs. So, yes, an RSO can call out another RSO. More importantly, the community should be able to hold an RSO accountable. Right?

The community should say, "Hey, look, you promise to send up a good service. We don't think that you're doing it." And that's why 47 exists. It has measurements to declare what we've already agreed to. But then there is even let's talk about a member of the SPAC. They're not living up to their appointment because of something.

So, unfortunately, that makes it very big because you need an accounting or an audibility check for everybody, and that could be much bigger than when we were originally talking about. So that's why I didn't want to go down that road. If we stick to just the RSOs, then it's just that. What is the purpose of the service? We have a measurement system for it. And there's a framework for an entity of some kind to take them to task. And without going down, what is the original constitution in the United States where the constitution in most countries is very small. Because prescribing all of the evils that you might be able to do or all the ways that you should get gold stars is fraught with impossibility to complete.

BRAD VERD: So if I try to distill this down, again, going back to what I said earlier about, like, trying to ensure that everything we're talking about or anything we identify here is building trust in the root server system. When you say take them to task, are you

suggesting that the principle is that the governance system needs to be able to take the RSOs to task.

WES HARDAKER: Yeah. I mean, I think that's the end goal, right? Trust is built because there is a mechanism to provide reproach for when you think somebody's heading in the wrong direction. It doesn't necessarily mean we need to spell out the entire legal system framework for doing that, but at least there's a reporting mechanism.

BRAD VERD: And, Geoff, does that build on what you were saying?

GEOFF HUSTON: To a certain extent, I think Wes is headed down a path of accountability and even further in, I suppose, what I would call an enforcement of accountability. In other words, are you doing what you promised you would do in being part of the root service system? And that's okay, but I just can't quite see that fitting inside the narrow bucket that we're talking about now about separation and balance of power. So accountability is in there. That's certainly true.

But I think when you want to talk about separation and balance of powers, I thought we were trying to identify how parties can exercise either influence or worse compulsion to force other parties. In other words, the powers aren't separate. The powers become dependent. And equally, a party can't do something, discharge their responsibilities unless they have powers from someone else, which again is improperly separated.

And what we're trying to do here, I thought was, rather than head down the accountability path, just try and talk about this principle that each party has a particular responsibility and a set of powers to do that. And they are not reliant on the powers of others or dependent or subject to other folks' powers to discharge theirs. I thought that was what you were trying to get at here as a principle. So I can see what Wes talking about, but I think it's sort of a different topic bucket.

BRAD VERD: I definitely see the difference of what you're saying, the difference between the accountability framework or principal and separation of balance of powers. But when you're listing these powers that people can make others subject to, I think, is what you said, can you expand on that? Like, which powers are you referring to? Because I think this is where we start getting into some of the funner topics.

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GEOFF HUSTON: Yeah. I would have thought that a root service operator has no power to publish an altered root zone. That is not a power it has. The power of determining the content of the root zone rests with not a root service operator. And then we can say, it's like the RZM, someone else. It's another party. And what's in the root zone and how it gets published are actually separate principles and determining how it's published is a pan out, but that's an RSO determining what is being published is the folk responsible for the content of the root one. So for the wantable label, let's call it the PTI. That was where I was kind of heading. Does that make sense?

BRAD VERD: It does. I mean, yes, except for me, it falls into one of-- you know, that's a technical principle or architectural that we'd referred to. I think what I was trying to touch on here more is when we think of governance systems, we think of relationships between entities or parties, specifically you think RSOs, or you think the root server governance system and the stakeholders of it. Maybe if finances is not a good subject to try to get the conversation going in the direction, what about, like, designation and removal?

So like when you think of Geoff, you used the example of the power to alter a copy of the root zone, who has the power to

designate an RSO? And who are those stakeholders that when we define it in the governance system, that people will have more trust in it. Be like, "Yeah, okay, I get it. That makes sense. I follow that." That's what I'm trying to touch on here. Liman?

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: Lars Liman from Netnod here. I think we need to create, we have to walk through something and apply something else to it. So either we need a set of various functions or committees that possibly carry power and then we need to look at what powers do we envisage these to have and how does that relate to the other bodies or we start with a list of powers that need to be assigned to someone and see where it fits.

So without having either of these as a starting point, this is going to be a very, very interesting exercise, I think. So either we start by walking through one of these lists and try to define what we have, and then we try to see how that relates to the other half. But it may be premature to do that at this point. I don't really know, but I think we have to get into that discussion at some point in order to see which pieces of puzzle do we have and how do we make them fit together. Thanks.

BRAD VERD: So can we list the powers maybe? I don't know. I'm like trying to --

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: I was thinking something along those lines and we can try to do that. We can start to try to build a list of these powers, I think. And that would be one starting point. Thanks.

BRAD VERD: Wes.

WES HARDAKER: This is Wes from USC. So I think some of the complexity is going back to, like, my previous question. Are we talking about the RSOs? Are we talking about the bubbles within two models which makes it hard? There's the model that the GWG came up with. There's the 37 model and there are different bubbles and different things. But I think your example of definition removal is a good one. So in a government system, you always want some sort of check and balance procedure.

And so the example that I have would be from the 37 architecture could the SAPF tell the DRF what change to make as opposed to that was supposed to be handled by them. Or in the newer model, could the board actually prescribe to another, the

designation removal. I don't remember what it's called in the new document, I apologize. This is the exact change you want to make as opposed to leaving that to them. So that designation removal function always should have a power associated with making that decision and no other bubble regardless of name should do that. Is that closer to your goal here?

BRAD VERD: A little bit. I have something to say, but I don't want to leave Aram. Again, I'm not watching the hands up. So I just saw that Aram's got her hand up. I'll let her go, and then I'll respond to you, Wes. Aram.

ARAM: Thank you. Can you hear me?

BRAD VERD: Yes.

ARAM: Okay, thanks. So governance means how something is managed, right? So one of the ways that we could also address this is, what is it that needs to be managed? So what is it that we do as root operators that needs to be managed? And then what are those powers that influence how something is managed, and how do

we make sure that there is a balance to those powers that are influencing those things that need to be done.

So we could turn this pyramid upside down and say what is it that we do? And then who is part of the influencing? What are the influencing components that we should allow or have a right to be part of that management of that output? So we could even focus a little bit on what is the output and then what are the influencing factors that are input to create that output? So thank you.

BRAD VERD: Thank you, Aram. I think Aram's comment blends in with what my response to Wes would be. In the designation removal function, first and foremost, I hope we're not talking about any specific model here, either the PRS or any other. We're just we're talking about what is the right thing to do. And when we think about the RSSAC58, the example I go back to with the designation removal function is that one of the success criteria in there was that the RSOs stated that they needed to have a super majority in a decision of removing one of the RSOs, right?

And so the principle that I take out of that is that the RSOs want to have a strong say in the designation and removal function, specifically in that case, removal function. So when we think about balance or separation of powers, it's like, well, who else

would also, and how do we want to think about that while trying to increase the trust of the community in the governance system. Does that make sense, Wes?

WES HARDAKER: Yes, it does. I think Liman's point was is hard to talk about this with that example. So my purpose for putting in bubbles was something to walk through as I think Liman said.

BRAD VERD: Geoff, your hand is up again.

GEOFF HUSTON: And the mute button is now on. Yes, I'm sort of trying to work through this and in my head separate out principles versus specifics. And if this is a conversation about principles, then I think some very traditional principles of good governance hold here in this context as much as in many other places. The folk who make the policy should not be the folk who enforce the policy.

And even better, the folk who make the policy should not be the people who undertake the actions dictated by that policy. You're trying to separate out the making of the rule, the conduct according to the rule, and the evaluation as to how well the rules

are being followed into distinct bodies. Why? Because otherwise, if you mix that and don't have distinct separation, you effectively get a cabal, where the rule making and the assessment about the rules is so intertwined, it's no longer accountable to anyone outside this click itself.

And so if you want those principles of the separation of power, you've actually got to think about who makes the policy, who, if you will, operates according to the policy, and who evaluates whether the policy is being followed or even worthwhile, and think about that as different entities. No single party should be in a position to set policies.

And so even in the area that you want policy determination to be separate from its implementation to instill trust, you certainly don't want a dictatorship benign or otherwise. You don't want a single entity, person, company, whatever, to be in the position of setting policy in the system because, again, that's not a good balance of power, is it?

Now once you do those kind of principles, I'm a bit stark as to what others underlying generic principles about separation and balance of power. You've got rule makers, rule enforcers, and rule followers as being three parts of the triangle. It actually corresponds in social governance to the legislators, the judiciary,

and the police forces. And that's the same principle of work going on here, which is where I borrowed it from. Does that help?

BRAD VERD: Yeah, it does. But then when you start, like, can you fill in who the players are in those different categories.

GEOFF HUSTON: Well, I think that becomes that becomes pretty easy, actually, Brad, in terms of the policies and practices of the root server system. It's partially the ITF. It's partially, let me think about who it would be, the PTI, the roots zone manager, the RZERC. There's a whole bunch of folk who are working on this idea of what the job should be and how it should happen, the policies. And so those bodies are necessarily not the root service operators all by themselves. They might participate, but they're certainly not in a position to force an outcome from these other bodies, be it the ITF or whoever.

BRAD VERD: Well, I think while it might be easy for you to identify where those players fall, it might not be easy for everybody else on where they fall, and that's why I wanted to have that discussion here. Wes, your hand is up?

WES HARDAKER: Geoff, did you have your hand up earlier?

GEOFF HUSTON: I did, but I took it down because I finished what I had to say, Wes.

WES HARDAKER: Other, Jeff. Not yet. Okay. So Geoff Houston, Geoff, I think it is a fundamental tenant of what you said, which is that the people making the policy shouldn't be the ones who are implementing or enforcing the policy. I think that's critical. There's one example that keeps coming back on the government analogy, though, where one body in the government makes a policy that is unimplementable by the body that's actually supposed to execute it. And that happens all the time because they're not given the resources. It's going to cost $3 trillion and they literally can't do it. And it comes to court cases and all sorts of things.

So you do have to be careful about that. We've been very lucky in the RSS so that has not happened. And a lot of that luck is not luck. It comes from the fact that the RSOs are heavily involved in most of the policy making decisions too, so we could say that's not going to work. I don't know the solution to that. I only bring it up as be careful and watch out for that. There's got to be a back feed or a back propagation to say that can't work.

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BRAD VERD: Robert, you have hand up.

ROBERT CAROLINA: Yes. Thanks very much. Robert Carolina, ISC. I wanted to just take a moment to explore in a little more detail the suggested principle about people who make policy or not the people who enforce the policy. I think on the face of it, that makes some amount of sense if the frame of reference is sort of an individual.

We don't want a person individually to make laws for themselves to be only responsible to themselves and to no one else. However, in a governance structure, it is, I think, very common, and I would say even necessary for people acting collaboratively to adopt policy that they must follow individually. I mean, to my way of thinking that is just another way of saying governance or government.

We have people at least in the system of representative democracy. We have people who serve as the representatives of people who are expected to follow laws are the ones who are making laws, and the people who make laws are themselves expected to follow the laws that they're making unless it's the US Congress and they decide not to and they write it down that way. We all know some examples like that.

So I think that's a really good principle. I think that we need to be careful not to read too much into it. And one of the reasons I mentioned this, and then I'll move off and let somebody else have a go, is that one of the things that our RSSAC said very clearly in RSSACO58, was this idea that the RSOs as a collective have had for many decades and should continue to have a significant voice, not just in operations, but also in governance.

And so if that is going to be carried out, that suggests that some combination, some collective of RSOs, presumably acting in a collective with others to be defined will collectively be involved in making policy, and then they will individually be expected to follow it. It's a good principle, but I think it needs a bit more expansion and drilling down.

BRAD VERD: Thanks, Robert. Susan, you have your hand up.

SUZANNE WOOLF: Thanks, Brad. This is Susan. I'm trying to think through these issues and other governance systems I've seen. And one of the things I'm trying to think through is which kinds of decisions that one branch of this system will be making need to be appealable or have some sort of reconsideration mechanism as a process check. It seems to me that designation and removal should have

some mechanism for people who feel that the process wasn't carried out to get another set of eyes on it. I'm not sure what that looks like. So there's the half-baked thought.

BRAD VERD: Liman.

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: Liman from Netnod here. Geoff Houston mentioned the thing that stuck with me that I think we've kind of missed in many deliberations way back. And that is the mechanism of assessing whether the principles are good in themselves and how to evolve the principles. Where are the auditors for the processes?

We did run into that problem with the Customer Standing Committee where the processes and values were cast in stone in a contract that was very difficult to change. So no thought was put into how to change this in the future. We should probably hold on to that thought so that we bake that into the system how to evolve it into the future if we need to make changes to these power structures that we are probably trying to design here. Let's just make a note of that somewhere so that we carry that with us. Thanks.

BRAD VERD: Yeah. No. I think that's important to note how to evolve. Obviously, none of these are set in stone. Well, I mean, I think even any governance system you're going to run through it just like anything we've done. I say we, I mean, the RSOs or even RSSAC. We've learned as we've gone through it. We've improved upon it. We've made changes to it. So, yeah, the system definitely needs to be able to do that. So that should certainly be one of the underlying principles that we will document and talk about.

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: Excuse me. And that in itself is actually a power to at least kick off that process or even drive it and interact with other bodies. So that's one of the powers that we need to -- it's one of the pieces of the puzzle that needs to fit in.

BRAD VERD: So let's go back to listing the powers. Wes, I think you were helping with that. I'm going to start calling somebody else out if no one else wants to talk. Obviously, designation and removal.

KEN RENARD: This is Ken Renard. One of the ones that was called out in 37 was the specifically for separation was the separation of designation removal from the determination of what's the correct number of

RSOs. So in that sense is determining the correct number of RSOs is a function of time. Is that another power?

BRAD VERD: You say is a function of the time, I don't follow.

KEN RENARD: It just 10 years from now, we might need a different number of RSOs.

BRAD VERD: I don't know. What do people think about that?

OZAN SAHIN: Brad, Geoff has a hand up.

BRAD VERD: Geoff, Houston.

GEOFF HOUSTON: I'm about to sidetrack. So this question about how many RSOs and determining, I suppose, to generalize it, the composition of the set of RSOs is certainly a relevant governance or at least a relevant policy attribute that the governance system should

solve. I was actually going to say something that I said a little earlier that hasn't been picked up as a, I think, a power. And that is the content of the root zone is a power, determining that content.

BRAD VERD: I can't disagree with that statement, Geoff. I don't think it's part of the root server system though. Certainly, it is not something that's been considered the root server governance system. That's out of scope here.

GEOFF HOUSTON: I think it's one of those things, Brad, that says, it goes without saying that the root zone operators don't change the root zone. So no one's ever said it. And the answer really is documenting what we commonly assume as the right thing actually has some value, I think. That there is no power inside some parts of this system to change the content of the zone, but there is a power because the zone changes.

There is a power where other folk have, namely the PTI, and indeed, if I think it right, the RZM when we look about that zone MD record. Other folk do have that power and it's kind of a bit of a quibble as to whether they inside the root service system or off to one side. I tend to have an inclusive view of that, Brad. But if

you're taking a narrower view, you're probably right. And I'm not sure I would agree with that narrow interpretation. Thank you.

BRAD VERD: What does everybody else think about that? This is not a me, Geoff, and Wes conversation, but what does everybody else think about that scope of what Geoff just shared? Liman.

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: Liman here. I think I agree with you. I agree with Geoff that it is a power, but I also agree it's a power that is not part of the structure that we are trying to design and work with here. So if we should list it in the column that powers that are not part of this, so that we recognize it as power, but we also clearly stated that that is something that we take out of the discussion.

What you might want to do is to -- it's been a statement from the roots of operators for very many and long years that we only published the data as produced by the IANA trail of publication. And the resulting structures that we build here and the powers in there should probably maintain that statement in the system somewhere. And maybe what Geoff is saying here is that we were stating it not as a power that is conducted within the system, but with this power that we clearly see as outside the system. And

maybe that statement in itself is important to have in this structure.

BRAD VERD: Yeah. And if I can add to that, I think that statement builds to the trust of the stakeholders to the root server system. Does somebody else want to say-- Wes, you were reaching for the mic earlier.

WES HARDAKER: Well, two things. One, I think the other power that you alluded to earlier was like finance, right? So some entity should not have absolute control over this RSO gets this amount of financial funding and this other one gets a different amount and whatever. So I was bringing back a power that you mentioned earlier.

But to Liman's point, I was going to actually say the same thing that he just said about IANA, is where we get the root data from. Putting it more specifically, I don't think that this group should touch any other parts of the ICANN process that already exists. So that includes RZERC, it includes everything else.

So the line for me of where we have, unless we have a really good reason to change that line and incorporate other bodies that previously are external, that's not us. And so the interesting one that Geoff Houston brought up, which is the RZM, that one sort of

almost sitting on that line. It's the only thing I can think of that's even close. Because the ICANN publication is way outside the line. RSSAC is already way outside that line. So that's where I think we ought to draw the line in general.

BRAD VERD: Any other thoughts on that in response to Geoff's comment, Geoff Houston's comment. A lot of quiet people. Geoff, with those comments back at you, does that?

GEOFF HUSTON: I materially agree with Lars -Johan Liman's encapsulation of this sort of saying, it's a power, but it's not a power that's being drawn into this particular governance system, but we do recognize that. And I think Wes is saying much the same thing. There are a bunch of other parts of the larger picture, which are not, if you will, considered inside this governance structure, and not being drawn into this governance structure.

And if you wanted to talk about the principle of the separation and balance of powers, as a principle, this is not a governance of all things root, deliberately, it's not. It's a quite a defined subset of things that are concerned with the roots zone. And that's if you will a sift right at the front of this exercise, which is used. And documenting that, I think, is just fine to say, some parts are

outside this governance system, and that's okay. So I think I'm in agreement with Wes and Lars-Johan here.

BRAD VERD:	Great. Yeah. I think, to me one of the myths that I think the RSOs deal with all the time is that this myth that the RSOs have this unlimited power of changing data and whatnot. And if we can clearly document this as a principle and call it out in the governance system, then it would again add to the trust that the stakeholders have in what's being billed.

WES HARDAKER:	Yeah. I have to say I almost typed up earlier with the comment of I don't feel like I have any power now. This feels like a very strange discussion, because I have no power. I'm about published data, that's all I do.

BRAD VERD:	Liman.

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN:	Liman here. I'm actually going to suggest different power. And please comment on that. Who decides from which IP addresses the data is going to be served? I will argue that that's up to the individual RSO. And we should probably put that into the system

preferably at that point and it builds a relationship with to the IANA function because it needs to be registered in root zone and what have you. But think that is a power relationship that needs to be part of the resulting things here.

BRAD VERD: I think Wes has an answer for you since Liman just gave you a power, and Wes, you said you didn't have any powers.

WES HARDAKER: Oh, boy. So I mean, that is a good question. And I'll stare at Kim too, right? It's like, if I said I'm going to renumber, could IANA say no? And the more interesting case, if I said, I'm no longer going to use an IPv4 address.

GEOFF HUSTONE: I've raised my hand, but I'm going to follow-up on Wes'. If you said you were going to renumber to the IP addresses used by the letter T root server who's already using them, in effect creating a jumbo any kind of [00:51:36 -inaudible], what about that? The rest of the power to say no, if I said, I'll use fictitious letters, but if server T or operator T decided to basically unofficially unite with serve U, and use the same IP addresses, and go further and go it looks an awful lot like shared infrastructure. Is that okay? Is that

their individual decision? Is this subject to why the review, or is that within their powers to individually do that?

BRAD VERD: We've got Aram in the queue. Liman, is this a quick response to Geoff or? Go ahead, Liman. And then we'll go Aram.

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: So Liman here, I think that falls into the holder or steward of the IP address space.   So who is allowed to announce that the reachability information for that IP address space? And I think that falls into the IP address handling structure of the RIRs and so on. So I think that is fairly easy to deal with. Thanks.

BRAD VERD: Yeah. Aram, you're in the queue?

ARAM: Thank you. And this ties back to the RSSAC session. I caught the tail end of previously where you guys went over data availability and data integrity and some of the reportings and who would have access to that and so forth. And there's a power to that as well. Who gets access to some of the reporting that you talked about earlier?

Because there is power to that knowledge, right? What are the vulnerabilities that have occurred that could be power to the wrong person. They find out that, oh we were successful, and or we were not successful, or what has worked. There's just power in reporting like that. So just talk about power, I thought I would bring that up. Thank you.

BRAD VERD: Great. Thank you, Aram. Peter. Time check, we got about three minutes left here and I think we have a break. So is that enough time for you?

PETER KOCH: Yeah, thank you. This is Peter for the record. Just a short remark. I didn't attend the previous session, so I don't know what was discussed there in relation to this. But did I hear you, Liman, say that the root server operator has to be the owner of the address space? I don't want to deep dive into technology details here, but I think we are shifting away from the power question and the underlying technology. Because the merger question, I think, is a different thing. Maybe we should have a look at that.

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: The merger question is a different thing. So I think this point stands from the holder's steward of the IP address space who can

then delegate to someone the authority or the ability to announce it. So I think we can still handle that by noble parts that already exists and which are not part of this structure, but it is definitely a power.

PETER KOCH: Maybe one remark and then we take it into the brake or something. But being in a position to announce that address space is probably all foreigner to the question whether or not you can offer root name service on that address space.

LARS-JOHAN LIMAN: I think I need to think about that over the coffee break.

BRAD VERD: All right. On that note, we've got less than 60 seconds left for our break. So let's adjourn for 30 minutes and we'll be back here at 4:30 local time. See you then.

OZAN SAHIN: Stop the recording.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]